The "New European Union" - Characteristics, Contradictions and Challenges by Wolfgang Quaisser & Steve Wood
 
  OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT 










Nr. 30  Februar 2008 
Landshuter Str.4   
93047 Regensburg  
Telefon: 0941 943 54 10   
Telefax: : 0941 943 54 27   
E-Mail: oei@osteuropa-institut.de 
 Internet: www.osteuropa-institut.de 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Abteilung 
   
 
Kurzanalysen   Nr. 30  
und Informationen  Februar 2008 
                                                     
 
The “New European Union” – Characteristics,  
Contradictions and Challenges 
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∗ 
 
Endorsement of the ‘Reform Treaty’, culminating in its’ signing as the Treaty of Lisbon in December 
2007, promises to end the EU’s enduring institutional problems. The compromise reached is the best 
realistically possible outcome given the divergent interests in the EU27. Yet uncertainties and reserva-
tions remain: the Treaty must be ratified by all member states; and the proposed institutional solutions 
have to be tested in practice. Important areas of economic and social policy, along with much of fo-
reign and security policy, and all of defence, are still the domain of national governments. The Single 
Market is yet to be completed and in several member state polities resistance to greater liberalisation 
is strong. The framework conditions for functionality have improved but this does not guarantee that 
governments will vigorously tackle common challenges in a coordinated and efficient way at national 
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Overcoming institutional impasse: What 
Now? 
Before the eastern enlargement process began, 
and as it proceeded, it was widely held that insti-
tutional reforms were needed to enable the EU to 
operate efficiently with 25, 27 or more members. 
That is, apposite reforms should have been in 
place before the 2004 enlargement was con-
cluded. As attempts to streamline the EU (at 
Amsterdam and Nice) failed, political and tech-
nocratic logic altered. From some perspectives, 
enlargement became a precondition for institu-
tional reforms in order to surmount gridlock. 
After the debacle at Nice and the discourag-




horse-trading and opaqueness of internal EU 
diplomacy, the constitutional convention intro-
duced a new approach. The ‘Convention on the 
Future of Europe’, representing national parlia-
ments, the European Parliament (EP), national 
governments and the European Commission, 
discussed, for the first time in an open forum, the 
future design and functioning of the Union. Rep-
resentatives of the then member states in waiting 
participated in the discussions without possess-
ing formal voting power. 
In summer 2003 the Convention presented a 
draft agreement on a European constitution. The 
qualities of that document (a leviathan of 465 
articles, five protocols and three declarations) are 
debatable, but it made several important propos-
als. They included an enhanced ability to act, a 
simplification of decision-making procedures, 
expanded powers of the EP, and the consolidat-
ing of all existing treaties in one document.  A 
draft Constitutional Treaty (CT) was signed by 
the then 25 member states in 2004.  Eighteen 
states later ratified the CT. 
The subsequent rejection of the CT in spring 
2005 by the electorates of France and the 
Netherlands, two of the EU’s founding members, 
demonstrated that disorientation and despon-
dency about the future of Europe had intensified. 
After this shock, different proposals were floated 
on how to regroup and proceed. Given the 
obstructions, and largely exposed negotiation 
positions, it was a minor miracle that what beca-
me known as a ‘Reform Treaty’ (RT) was agreed 
at Brussels in June 2007.  
The RT, which preserved much of the CT’s 
substance, was accepted in October 2007 and 
signed as the Treaty of Lisbon (ToL) in that city in 
December.
1 The ToL introduces a better voting 
and decision-making system: double majority of 
55% of member states and 65% of the total EU 
population, expansion of qualified majority voting 
(QMV), formal merger of overall responsibility for 
EU (not individual member state) foreign and 
security policy and external relations, a longer-
term President, and a smaller Commission, re-
duced from a top-heavy college of perhaps 30 
commissioners by 2014 to 20. It also allows for 
greater parliamentary oversight by national and 
European legislatures. A candidate (or candi-
dates) for the Commission Presidency will be 
proposed by the European Council and accepted 
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The Treaty of Lisbon amends the Treaty on European Union 
and the Treaty establishing the European Community. Al-
though a chief goal of the new Treaty was to simplify the EU’s 
legal basis, it is also not especially concise. There are around 
160 pages of amendments to previous treaties followed by 
another 100 or so for protocols and annexes. An additional 
Final Act comprises 13 Protocols and 65 Declarations. 
or rejected by the EP. Deferral of the new ar-
rangements to 2014-2017, which was needed to 
overcome resistance led by Poland, and other 
special provisions, confirm persisting national 
egotism and underlying rifts. A wide-ranging pub-
lic debate about policymaking and the ultimate 
goals, instruments and limits of the EU has not 
yet happened.  
Despite new parliamentary powers, the Méth-
ode Monnet, with its elitism and secrecy, was 
quietly reanimated to push through the ToL 
(Wessel et. al. 2007). It may be that there is no 
other way to overcome the various blockades but 
it does not represent a more transparent and 
democratic Europe (Goulard 2007: 506). In fact, 
it restates one of the central contradictions and 
ongoing dilemmas of the EU: if it really is a Union 
of ‘states and citizens’, then why are its elites so 
averse to allowing European electorates the 
chance to confer a direct democratic imprimatur 
upon the compromises reached, and proposals 
presented by their governments and the EU insti-
tutions, by voting on the ToL in referendums? An 
opportunity of sorts is available to citizens via 
Article 8B of the ToL, whereby a quorum of not 
less than 1 million who are nationals of ‘a signifi-
cant number of member states’ may ask the 
Commission to submit a proposal on a matter 
they consider requires a legal act (ToL 2007: 19). 
The agreements reached in June 2007 and 
confirmed in December provide some grounds 
for hope that the long crisis will soon be over. 
Astute strategy by the German presidency (Mau-
rer 2007), substantial compromises, and a cer-
tain fatigue after six years of quarrelling since 
Nice, make this possible. Yet disquiet and scepti-
cism cannot be ignored. The target date for ratifi-
cation by all member states of the ToL is 1 Janu-
ary 2009, in time for the next EP elections. If 
adopted, the ToL could serve as a quasi-
constitutional basis of the Union that creates 
scope for further developments. Much depends 
on political leaders using the possibilities opened 
up to encourage ‘self-assertion’ (Schmidt 2000) 
by the EU, which is an implicit intention of the 
Treaty. The EU needs more than institutional 
reforms. These must be accompanied by sub-
stantive action in economic and social policy, 
adjustments in agricultural  and regional policy 
and financing, and resolution in external affairs, 
security issues, and neighbourhood policy. Failu-
re will throw the Union into an even deeper crisis. 
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TABLE 1   The Constitutional Treaty and the Treaty of Lisbon: Features and Differences 
Issues  Constitutional Treaty  Treaty of Lisbon 
Designed for ….  Union of States and Citizens  High Contracting Parties 
Character   Based on existing treaties with no 
extensive downsizing or simplifi-
cations  
Changes incorporated into the EU/EC Treaties as a-
mendments, including modifications, protocols and 
declarations, taking account of the specific concerns of 
member states 
Name  Constitutional Treaty  Treaty of Lisbon. Two substantive clauses amend exist-
ing treaties: Treaty of the European Union and the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community, renamed 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU  
Charter of Human 
Rights 
Incorporated in the Treaty  A protocol of the Treaty (not binding for the UK and 
Poland) 
Symbols  Flag and Hymn  Not part of the Treaty but 16 states signed a separate declara-
tion affirming they will use the symbols 
Competencies  Exit from the EU possible  National parliaments have more power to repatriate competen-
cies 
Qualified Majori-
ty Voting (QMV) 
QMV extended to most decisions 
except taxation, social benefits, 
defence, some foreign policy 
UK opt-out and opt-in arrangements regarding the euro, asylum 
and border controls remain; extended QMV delayed until 2014 
or 2017.  
Titles and phra-
sing 
“Union Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs”, “European Law” and “Eu-
ropean Guideline Law” 
Replaced by “High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy” (the previously 
used term); the term “European Law” has been replaced 
by the old formula “Regulation and Directive”. Almost 
complete removal of references to the ‘European Com-
munity’ or ‘European Communities’, which has tended 
to confuse many observers, in favour of a ubiquitous 
title of ‘European Union’. 
Economic and 
social affairs 
Commitment to free market and 
competition 
As a result of French pressure, a reference to “undis-
torted competition” has been removed. A “commit-
ment” to free markets and competition is underlined 
elsewhere; the ECB’s attempts to acquire a special 
institutional status have been rejected; a protocol ena-
bling the EU to protect the “internal market” has been 
added 
Sources: Miller, Vaughne (2007); Hänsch, Klaus (2007); Seeger, Sahra and Janis Emmanouilidis (2007).  
 
 
Foreign Affairs, Security, and the Neighbour-
hood 
If resolving internal demands and problems 
represents a formidable undertaking, those chal-
lenges that stem from outside are potentially 
more serious and even threatening to the EU. A 
gradual shift towards a more ‘realist’ interpreta-
tion of and approach to external policy can be 
detected. At the same time some progress in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and the European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP) has occurred. The full range of policy 
instruments and resources will need to be deftly 
and sometimes forcefully applied: diplomatic skill, 
structural economic power, technical and techno-
logical assets, financial aid, and human and con-
ventional security capacities on regional and 
global scales. As the EU can no longer be pri-
marily a ‘consumer of security’ rather than a pro-
vider of it, this must include an advanced and 
coordinated military capability backed by the OSTEUROPA-INSTITUT REGENSBURG 
political will, if necessary, to deploy it. Intergov-
ernmentalism continues to predominate, as all 
‘decisions with military implications or those in 
the area of defence’ remain cordoned off from 
QMV (ToL 2007: 51).  
A development that should give the EU a 
greater external presence and improve the effi-
ciency of its functioning in the foreign and secu-
rity policy area is the merging of the offices of 
High Representative for CFSP (HR) and that of 
Commissioner for External Affairs. The HR will 
chair a ‘Foreign Affairs Council’ and ‘ensure im-
plementation of the Decisions adopted by the 
European Council and the Council’. To fulfil ‘his 
mandate’, the HR ‘shall be assisted by a Euro-
pean External Action Service’ (ToL 2007: 36). 
Before it can credibly claim to be a comprehen-
sive global actor the EU has to impress itself as 
the premier regional power, meaning on the 
European continent and in its wider neighbour-
hood. Although the EU attempts to establish itself 
in such a role by offering positive incentives, 
developing institutionalised relations, and build-
ing economic, commercial and cultural partner-
ships, some neighbours do not want the EU 
dominating the regional agenda. There are op-
ponents to EU visions and preferences, promi-
nently a resurgent Russia.  
Energy represents a huge challenge, not only 
for environmental reasons, but because of the 
EU’s large and growing dependency, mainly on 
states in its neighbourhood, almost none of which 
could be described as reliable liberal democra-
cies. EU energy security is complicated by a 
relationship with Russia that has undergone sig-
nificant change, seemingly in Russia’s favour, in 
recent years (Wood 2008).  
Along with advancing its material interests, 
the EU is under pressure to prove itself an au-
thentic ‘normative power’ in international affairs: 
one that projects its, allegedly distinctive, values 
in the world and has the capacity and will to pro-
mote and defend them. The nature, scope and 
intricacies of this task, and the number of cases it 
has to deal with, suggest the EU will be hard 
pressed to sustain the interest-based partner-
ships needed for its economies and societies to 
function in peace and prosperity, and simultane-
ously pursue a role as driver of regional democ-
ratisation and unconditional upholder of human 
rights.  
These are some of many exogenous con-
cerns that the better cohesion promised by the 
ToL can assist the EU to deal with. The world 
outside, however, is largely independent of the 
EU’s formal internal configurations.  
 
 
The Agenda Ahead 
The EU is featured by a lack of correspondence 
between the proclamation of grand visions and 
projects and the more prosaic but critical re-
quirement to formulate and apply convincing 
policy designs. The agenda ahead is not so 
much determined by what the Union wants to 
achieve but what the Union has to do in order to 
meet challenges presented by globalisation, 
enlargement and real or potential threats to eco-
nomic and physical security. Solutions that are 
found often reflect political processes of interest 
equalisation rather than ‘maximum European 
value added’ outcomes from invested community 
funds. Different understandings on the nature 
and purpose of the EU underpin these limitations. 
Nonetheless it is possible to identify a more or 
less common pool of values - though it is uncer-
tain how deep this pool is - and policy prefer-
ences that indicate a social and environmental 
bias. In some areas more distinct manifestations 
of a ‘European political will’ have begun to 
emerge and must be exploited.  
 
Public support and a diversified Union 
At first appraisal the ToL, which represents a 
partial retreat from the CT and erases the term 
‘constitution’, offers a basis for solving some of 
the EU’s major problems. It will become apparent 
soon enough if this basis has or can be built u-
pon. Institutional actors and national politicians 
must convince publics that the EU project is one 
in their own interest. Well functioning institutions, 
responsible policies, economic success including 
employment growth, and improved security will 
demonstrate this better than public relations 
campaigns. It is possible that one parliament or 
electorate will reject the ToL. Only Ireland has a 
constitutional obligation to hold a public referen-
dum though the governments of other states may 
realise they have a political obligation. It would 
be perilous to ignore unrelenting public demand. 
If a parliamentary or popular veto were to occur, 
it is unlikely that that a majority of member states 
would accept a blocking of integration by the 
renegade. A negative vote implies a split of the 
EU or an exit from it by that particular state. The 
exit of one (or more) state/s would not mean the 
end of the EU but would seriously damage its 
credibility. 
 
Reforms of EU policies 
Solving the institutional question does not auto-
matically fix all other challenges. Reforms of core 
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EU policies must be driven forward to promote 
economic growth, employment and structural 
change. The current system reflects a quid pro 
quo international political economy rather than an 
optimal use of common resources. The next op-
portunity for a serious discussion will be the 2008 
mid-term review of agricultural and regional poli-
cies. This could be combined with a re-design of 
the EU ‘own resource’ (financial) system. An 
essential step would be to clarify regional, na-
tional and EU wide competencies in order to 
define the potential ‘European value added’ of 
specific policies. It appears that fundamental 
changes could not be expected but rather small 
steps such as further de-linking of agricultural 
subsides from the means of production. Some 
proposals may only be put on the table when 
earnest discussion on the next financial period 
commences around 2012. In the meantime, 
spending must be shifted from subsidies to in-
vestment that promotes European networks in 
technology, education and innovation. One area 
that could benefit is environmental policy where 
the EU has set itself ambitious emission reduc-
tion targets and presupposed that a then requi-
site economic and social transformation will suc-
cessfully occur. The real test of EU commitment 
will come when financial demands and other 
diverse effects catch up to the political rhetoric. 
 
Increased membership and structural change  
Since 2004 the EU is not only larger but far more 
heterogeneous. This affects decision-making 
constellations and interest equalisation through 
financial transfers. To the present, economic 
integration has been successful, reflected by a 
tremendous increase in flows of goods and capi-
tal and the inclusion of central and eastern Euro-
pean economies into the networks of (Western) 
European enterprises. The gradual convergence 
of countries with different income and productivity 
levels is not an overwhelming macroeconomic 
challenge as it promotes positive welfare effects 
(Kohler 2007). It is a social challenge because it 
causes temporary - and perhaps longer-term - 
hardship for some regions and sections of popu-
lations affected by structural changes, production 
relocation or outsourcing. Hence it is also a po-
litical challenge. Compensating losers, the basic 
purpose of the so-called European Globalisation 
Funds, might mitigate tensions. However, the 
practical effects of this ‘sign of solidarity’ are re-
stricted as the program designed to help 35,000 
to 50,000 workers laid off per year has a budget 
of only €500 million per year. The major burdens 
of mitigating adjustment hardships will be shoul-
dered by national welfare systems. (Euroaktiv, 2 
March 2006).  
 
The Single Market and European Social Models: 
Harmonisation in social affairs is limited 
The combined forces of globalisation and eastern 
enlargement have placed sectors of the EU 
economy and labour market under pressure. 
They incite fears that transform into demands for 
stronger protection and underpin anti-
enlargement and anti-liberalisation attitudes in 
some old EU states. The prospect of solving 
these problems through harmonisation in eco-
nomic and social fields is muted because ‘widen-
ing’ the EU increased the variation of preferences 
and requirements in economic policy. Some pro-
jects of liberalisation have been postponed or 
diluted (like the service directive). Anxieties are 
reflected in a movement to preserve a ‘European 
economic and social model’. In reality, different 
models with varying levels of efficiency exist in 
Europe. Scandinavian ‘flexicurity’ paradigm but it 
is questionable whether it could be transferred to 
all other members (Knogler et al 2007). It is more 
likely that each country will develop its own 
means of adjustment as the scope for coordina-
tion of economic and especially social policy is 
limited (European Commission 2007a).  
Much depends on whether the EU, especially 
its larger member states, can overcome growth 
and employment problems. The past year or so 
was an improvement but it remains to be seen if 
economic expansion and lower unemployment 
will be sustained (European Commission 2007a). 
In light of the upturn there are signs that in some 
countries reforms may be watered-down. Coun-
tries with ‘Continental’ and ‘Southern’ models 
have much work to do on their labour markets 
and pension systems in order to cope with demo-
graphic change. Notwithstanding what has been 
achieved, the single market is incomplete and its 
growth-promoting potential is not being fully real-
ised (Wood and Quaisser 2007). Instead of fur-
ther strengthening this central pillar of the EU, 
some member states are undermining its’ func-
tioning. They attempt to hinder transborder merg-
ers and acquisitions and protect their national 
network industries. French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy’s insistence that there be no reference in 
the ToL to the inviolability of ‘free and open com-
petition’ was a telling indication of this concern..  
 
New approach needed for the Lisbon Agenda 
The results of the Lisbon Agenda, which set the 
ambitious goal of transforming the EU into ‘the 
most dynamic, knowledge-based economy in the 
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world by 2010’, are so far disappointing (Pisani-
Ferry 2005). Two basic reasons are responsible: 
the agenda was too broad and had contradictory 
priorities; and there was insufficient implementa-
tion of reforms in the member states (Kok 2003). 
What is also evident is that the strategy of ‘open 
coordination’ does not offer adequate incentives 
to achieve the best solutions in keeping with a 
‘benchmarking approach’. The EU is threatened 
with failing to achieve its stipulated goals, despite 
a stricter application of Lisbon provisions. The 
2005 revision to focus on growth and jobs with 
less objectives and a streamlining of the process 
may help (European Commission 2007b). Recent 
reports indicate some advances but a gap be-
tween goals and reality persists. National gov-
ernments bear a large responsibility. Greater 
emphasis on cross-border externalities, such as 
migration and higher education, and judicious 
use of greater financial means in these areas 
would better support the strategy at the commu-
nity level (Pisani-Ferry 2005). 
 
From enlargement to differentiated forms of EU-
Integration 
Enlargement, one of the most successful EU 
policies in the past decade through its promotion 
of democracy and free market economies in 
CEE, has come to a preliminary end. For security 
reasons the countries of the Western Balkans 
may constitute an exception and – as happened 
with Bulgaria and Romania – be admitted as 
members before they are genuinely ready. Other 
candidates, including and perhaps especially 
Turkey, will be treated more cautiously. Sarkozy 
recently rejected an ‘accession perspective’ for 
Turkey in an official document and supported the 
‘privileged partnership’ concept favoured by most 
Christian Democrats – and most of the public – in 
Germany.  Further enlargements will be guided 
much more by cost benefit calculations and full 
membership will not always be the final result. 
Differentiated forms of integration will emerge 
and be applied within the context of neighbour-
hood policy.  
 
The Common Foreign and Security Policy needs 
high priority 
The CFSP represents a key test of the EU’s ca-
pacity for self-assertion. Until now national ap-
proaches prevail. This will not change much in 
the short term but improved cooperation is possi-
ble and required. If trouble in Kosovo explodes 
the EU will again be asked difficult questions: is it 
capable of taking over from the US-led NATO as 
the leading security actor with responsibility for 
confined regional issues? What implications are 
there for an actor with global ambitions? Better 
coordination of armaments industries and equip-
ment acquisitions enables more investment in 
areas like strategic airlift capability. It would also 
send a signal to those that might seek to exploit 
what they perceive is an under-prepared or ir-
resolute EU. 
 
Conclusion: Confronting internal and external 
challenges 
A ratification of the ToL by all member states 
would overcome some of the hindrances of Nice 
and mean that the EU is better equipped institu-
tionally. Extension of QMV should facilitate more 
rapid compromises and decision-making. A 
drawback is that the QMV extension – to up to 50 
more policy areas – will not occur until 2014 and 
in full form not until 2017. This means that all 
member states, and pertinently here the poorer 
ones, retain veto power during negotiations on 
the next EU financial period (2014-2020) and will 
have the leverage to block proposed changes or 
enforce their own. In tax and social policies, EU 
competence remains limited under the new 
treaty. Meanwhile, there is also a continuing reli-
ance, or hope, that before 2017 no severe exter-
nal crisis emerges to seriously threaten the EU or 
some of its member states and publics. While the 
visibility and prestige of the High Representative 
for CFSP should increase, this field will remain 
largely intergovernmental and member states 
dependent, if such a crisis did occur, on their own 
capacities: alone, in some form of neo-traditional 
alliance, or on NATO. Internal security has seen 
improved EU-wide cooperation though national 
supremacy is retained there also with various 
opting-out rules, in particular for the UK. The will 
of national governments to introduce and sustain 
reforms, coordinated with EU partners, is critical. 
The ToL and improved institutional functionality 
alone cannot determine this.  
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